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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent
vs.

DAVID RILEY JACOB,

Case No. 18173

Defendant/Appellant

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The appellant, David Riley Jacob,

appeals from the finding

and order of the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County,
State of Utah, entered August 7, 1981.
DISPOSITION ]N THE LOWER COURT
The above captioned matter came before the Court on the
appellant's motion for a hearing to review whether or not his
sanity had been restored.

On August 7, 1981, the Honorable Christine

M. Durham found as a fact that the appellant had not recovered from
his mental illness and ordered that the appellant continue to be
maintained at the Utah State Hospital.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks to have the order of the District Court
that he continue to be maintained at the Utah State Hospital pursuant
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to §77-14-5, Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended) vacated.
Appellant seeks an order

releasing him from the custody

of the Utah State Hospital as having recovered his
sanity pursuant to former §77-24-16, Utah Code Ann. (1953 as
amended: repealed July 1, 1980).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On April 15, 1980, the appellant was found not guilty by
reason of insanity on a charge of aggravated arson, a second degree
felony.

(4/15/80 T.3.

See also stipulation of facts for trial

entered into by both the prosecution and defense.)

On that day

the trial court remanded the appellant to the custody of the
sheriff, providing that his custody be maintained at the Utah State
Hospital.

This committment was pursuant to §77-24-15, Utah Code

Ann. (1953 as amended, repealed July 1, 1980) pending a determination under the same statute as to "whether or not the defendant
has fully recovered his sanity" (4/15/80 T.5).

In its order of

May 6, 1980, the court appointed two individuals to help the court
make its determination.

The court ordered

that both examiners

report concerning the restoration of sanity under the definition
as follows:
The defendant's sanity is such that he is no
longer a danger to himself or others.
A hearing on this matter was held July 18, 1980.

After

hearing evidence and argument, the court ordered the appellant
transported back to the state hospital to be maintained there
pending its ruling, (7/18/80 T.67).

On January 30, 1981, the court

made the following finding of fact and conclusions of law:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-2-

FINDINGS OF FACT
1. That the def:eridari1: David Riley Jacob suffers
from a mental illness called schizophrenia.
2. That his condition is chronic.
3. That this condition can be treated and is
currently being treated by the use of antipsycotic
drugs and that when the defendant is treated with
these drugs his symptoms of this disease subside.
4. That when defendant's symptoms of· his mental
illness subside hathinks and acts as a person who
is sane.
5. That when defendant does not receive medication
symptoms of his ch~oriic mental illness reappear and
he then is insane and is a danger to himself and
others.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The defendant having submitted stipulated facts
to the Court, April 15, 1980, the crime having
occurred September 21, 1979, and the Court having
found the defendant not guilty by reason of insanity
April 15, 1980, the defendant is therefore entitled
to have determination on the question of his current
mental state to be made according to the statutes
in effect on the date of the trial, that being
§77-24-15, Utah Code Ann (as amended) and which has
since been amended on July 1, 1980.
2. The language of that section of the code
requires that the "Court shall determine whether
or not the defendant has fully [sic] recmvered
his - s_ani ty. "
3. The Court does not accept defendant's definition
of sanity that sanity for purposes of this hearing
be based on the opposite condition of the "defense
of insanity" as defined in §76-2-305(1) that is[sic]
shall be a defense that the defendant "at the time
of the prescrib'ed conduct as a result of mental
disease or defect lack substantial capacity either
to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or
to conform his conduct to the requirements of
law."
4. The Court finds that sanity although not defined
in the procedural section of the code in effect at
the time should be a standard similiar to the standard
used in civil proceedings. Therefore the standard
used by this Court basically is that the defendant
should be reasonably expected to not be a threat or
a danger of harm to himself or to others in the
foreseeable future.
THE COURT HEREBY CONCLUDES that the defendant,
-3Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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DAVID RILEY JACOB, suffers from a chronic mental
illness and finds with regard to the issue of
whether or not he has fully recovered his sanity
the following:
That when the defendant;. DAVID RILEY JACOB,
is being maitained with antipsychotic medication
he is in a condition which meets the test of
sanity and therefore is recovered.
2. That when the defendant, DAVID RILEY JACOB,
is not being maintained with antipsychotic
medicine his condition does not meet the test
of sanity and therefore has not recovered his
sanity.
1.

The riourt also issued an order of conditional release
providing that the defendant be released from the Utah State
Hospital upon terms and conditions advised by the staff and under
the supervision of Adult Parole and Probation.

This release was

to be on the specific condition that he be maintained on antipsycotic medicine at a level enabling him to remain sane or be
returned immediately to the custody of the Utah State Hospital.
The appellant was never released pursuant to that order.
On June 2, 1981, the appellant requested a hearing pursuant
to §77-24-16, Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended, repealed July 1,
1980) to review whether or not his sanity had been restored.
hearing was held July 22, 1981.

That

The court issued its order on

August 7, 1981'.
In that order the court vacated its previous order of
conditional release and found that, based on the evidence presented,
the findings of fact and conclusions of law entered January 30,
1981 were still applicable.

The court made the following additional

findings of fact and conclusions 6f ·law:
-4...,
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The defendant suffers from a chronic mental
illness which apparently has a biochemical
cause and psychological and behavioral manifestations. He is not now, and will in all
likelihood never be, recovered from the biochemical aspects of the disease. However,
it appears that so long as he receives an
appropriate maintenance dosage of medication,
his psychological and behavioral manif estations disappear. Historically, he has on
many occasions failed to maintain his medication level when not institutionalized,
and he has consequently (and in every instance)
become psychotic. In that condition, there
is no question, based upon the historical
information, that he is extraordinarily dangerous to others and to himself.
Under the circumstances just described, this
court cannot find that the defendant has~~
recovered from his mental illness within the
. meaning of the Utah statutes, and orders that
the defendant continue to be maintained at the
Utah State Hospital. Since there is no likelihood that a cure for defendant's illness
will be discovered soon, the above ruling may
well result in the lifetime institutionalization of an individual who could function
adequately, and without danger, in the community,
if his medication were carefully and closely
supervised. However, no means of lawful supervision appears to exist at this time, and some
revision of existing law would seem to be
required before the defendant in his present
condition could be released. (Emphasis
added.)
The appellant appealed from this order on September 1,
1981.
ARGUMENT
I

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS APPLICATION OF
§77-14-5, UTAH CODE ANN. (1953 AS AMENDED,
EFFECTIVE JULY 1, 1980) TO THIS ACTION. BECAUSE THIS CASE WAS ALREADY PENDING AT THE

-5-
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TIME §77-14-5 TOOK EFFECT, FORMER '§77-24-15
AND §77-24-16 APPLY BY VIRTURE OF THE UNITED
STATES AND UTAH CONSTITUTIONAL PROHIBITIONS
AGAINST EX POST FACTO LAWS.
The United States ConstittwtionArticle I, §10 and the Utah
Constitution Article I, §18 prohibit the enactment of ex post
facto laws.

Laws have been found to violate this prohibition which

retroaetiveiy, · increase the punishment for a crime, Lindsey v.
Washington, 301 U.S. 397, 57 S.Ct. 797, 81 L.Ed 1182 (1937), or
retroactively make changes in evidence and procedure which operate
to the disadvantage of the criminal defendant.

Thompson v. Missouri,

171 U.S. 380, 18 S.Ct. 922, 43 L.E.2d 204 (1898).

In particular,

procedural changes have been found to violate this prohibition when
they retroactively a·ffect a substantial right to which the accused
was entitled at the time of his offense.

Kring v. Missouri, 107

U.S. 221, 2 S.Ct. 443, 27 L.Ed. 506 (1883).
The new Utah Code of Criminal Procedure became effective
July 1, 1980.

Section 77-14-5 of that code provides:

77-14-5. Hearing on mental condition of defendant
found not guilty by reason of mental illness-Commitment to state hospital--Subsequent hearings. -- (l) When a jury renders a verdict of "not
guilty by reason of mental illness" pursuant to
section 76-2-305, the court shall proceed to
determine whether the defendant has recovered
from his mental illness. If, after hearing,
the defendant is determined to be mentally ill,
the court shall order him committed to the Utah
state hospital. The defendant shall not be
released from confinement therein until the
court which committed the defendant shall,
after hearing, find that the defendant has
recovered from his mental illness. Notice
shall be given to the prosecuting attorney
of the hearing.
(2) A defendant committed to the Utah state
hospital pursuant:J. to subsection(!) may apply,

-6-
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not sooner than six months from the date of the
commitment, to the district court of the county
from which he was committed, for an order of
release on the grounds that he has recovered
from his mental illness. At any time that the
defendant has recovered from his mental illness,
the clinical director of the state hospital shall
certify that fact to the court. The court shall
conduct a hearing within ten working days of the
receipt of the clincal director's report. If
the finding is adverse to the defendant, he shall
not be permitted another hearing more often than
once each year, unless the court otherwise orders.
In such hearings, the burden of proof is on the
applicant. (Emphasis added.)
The applicable statutes in effect on September 27, 1979, the date
the crime which gave rise to this action

occurre~

were former

§77-24-15 and §77-24-16:
77-24-15. Verdict of not guilty by reason of
insanity--Procedure.--Upon a verdict of not
guilty by reason of insanity being rendered by
a jury, the court shall determine whether or
not the defendant has fully recovered his sanity,
and the defendant shall be remanded to the
custody of the sheriff until his sanity shall
have been finally determined in the manner
prescribed by law. If the defendant is committed to a state hospital he shall not be
released from confinement, unless and until
the court which committed him, or the district
court of the county in which he is confined,
shall, after notice and hearing, find and
determine that his sanity has been restored.
In the event such hearing is held in the county
from which the defendant was committed, notice
as ordered by the court shall be given to the
district attorney for the district in which
said county is located. In the event such
hearing is held in the county where the
defendant is confined, notice as ordered by
by the court shall be given to the district
attorney for the district in which said county
is located, and also to the district attorney
for the district in which the county is located
from which said defendant was corrnnitted.
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77-24-16. Application for release on ground
sanity restored.--A person who has been committed
to a state hospital, as provided in section
77-24-15, may apply to the district court for
the county in which he is confined or for the
county from which he was committed, to be
released on the ground that his sanity has been
restorede No hearing upon such application
shall be allowed a person until he shall have
been confined for a period of not less than·.
one year from the date of the order of commitment, and if the finding of the court be adverse
to him upon such, or any subsequent application
for release, on the ground that his sanity has
not been restored, he shall not be permitted to
file a further application until one year has
elapsed from the d~teof hearing upon his last
preceeding application. In any hearing authorized
by this section, the burden of proving that his
sanity has been restored shall be upon the person
applying for such hearing.
·(Emphasis added.)
The appellant maintains that the retroactive use of the
new standard of "recovered from the mental illness" subjects him
to a higher burden of proof in his case than the standard of
"sanity has been restored."

Thus its use operates to his dis-

advantage, deprives him of a substantial right to which he was
entitled at the time of his offense, and comes within the constitutional prohibitions.
It is true that the ex post facto prohibition applies
only to laws respecting criminal punishment.

Johannessen v.

United States, 225 U.S. 227, 32 S.Ct. 613, 56 L.Ed. 1066 (1912).
Although the procedures for inquiry into the continuing
insanity of a person acquitted by reason of insanity are not purely
criminal in nature, they are at least quasi-criminal.

They are

part of the criminal code, they require notice to the district
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attorney, and most importantly they involve involuntary incarceration as the result of the prior commission of a crime.
The Washington Supreme Court applied this principle in
Johnson v. Morris, 87 Wash.2d 922, 557 P.2d 1299 (1976).
case dealt

That

with changes in the Washington State juvenile code.

The court held that even though the juvenile code was not technically
a criminal code and not punishment oriented, it did involve restraint
of liberty and involuntary incarceration.

The court held

proceed-

ings under·the code were subject to the same strict constitutional
scrutiny they wo:uld be if there were deemed "criminal proceedings"
and involuntary incarceration under the code was punishment within
the purview of the ex post facto prohibition.

557 P.2d at 1304,

1305.
Whether or not the appellant's mental health had been
restored was both a subject of inquiry at the July 22, 1981 hearing
and a basis for the t'rial court's order of August 7, 1981.

It was

error for the court to consider this standard in anywayin its
determination since such a standard requires the appellant to
show a higher degree of "wellness" than merely that he has been
restored to his sanity.
II
TO THE EXTENT THE COURT BASED ITS DETERMINATION
ON THE PROPER STANDARD OF WHETHER THE APPELLANT
HAD BEEN RESTORED TO HIS SANITY, IT USED AN
IMPROPER DEFINITION OF SANITY.
_Although in its order of August 7, 1981, the c:ourt relied
-9Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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on the new code's "restoration of mental health" inquiry, the
court also found that is former order of January 30, 1981, relying
of the proper inquiry of''restoration of sanity," was still appliaable.

In that order the court had used a definition .of sanity

similar to the standard used in civil proceedings "that the
defendant should be reasonably expected to not be a threat or a
danger of harm to himself or others in the foreseeable future."
The defense counsel contends that this definition for
"restoration of sanity" was clearly erroneous.

The definition of

the defense of mental disease or defect §76-2-305, the verdict
returned against the appellant of not guilty by reason of insanity,
§77-33-4 (repealed July 1, 1980) and the procedures to be taken
following such a verdict are all part of th& Utah Criminal Code
and the Utah Code of Criminal Procedure.

§76-1-106 of the Criminal

Code provides that "all provisions of the code.

shall be

construed according to the fair import of their terms to promote
justice and to effect the objects of the law and general purposes
of §76-1-104.

Section 76-1-104(4) provides that one of those

purposes is to "prevent arbitrary.

or oppressive treatment of

persons accused or convicted of offenses."

In addition, § 68-3-11

dealing with the rules of construction to be applied to the 1953
codification of the Utah Code Annotated provides:
68-3-11. Rules of construction as to words and
phrases.--Words and phrases are to be construed
according to the context and the approved usage
of the language; but technical words and phrases,
and such others as have acquired a peculiar and
appropriate meaning in law, or are defined by
statute, are to be construed according to such
-10Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

peculiar and appropriate meaning or definition.
Due process requires that meanings of statutes not be
decided arbitrarily.

In fact, protection from arbitrary govern-

mental action is the very essence of due process.

Estate of Baker,

222 Kan. 127, 563 P.2d 431 (1977), Thompson v. Harris, 107 Utah 99,
152 P.2d 91 (1944).

The Supreme Court of the United States has

held that "no one may be required at peril of life, liberty or
property to speculate at the meaning of penal statutes." Lanzetta
v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453, 59 S.Ct. 618, 619, 83 L.Ed. 888,
890 (1939).

Further, it has held in accord with the Utah rules of

construction that courts may construe statutes in terms of the
text of the statutes and the subjects with which they deal.

Connally

v. General Construction, 269 U.S. 385, 46 S.Ct. 126, 70 L.Ed. 322
(1926).

See also Cannon v. McDonald, 615 P.2d 1268 (Utah 1980).
There is no mention in the Utah Criminal Code or the Utah

Code of Criminal Procedure of any standard of sanity based on an
accused's potential for harm to himself or others.

It appears

from the record (4/15/80 T.7) that the court used this standard
based on a mistaken reliance on several cases cited by the
prosecutor (7/18/80 T.13,14,43,62, 65) and the letter of Dr.
Austin dated June 24, 1980.

These cases were Bolton v. Harris,

395 F.2d 642 (D.C.Cir. 1968), Clark v. State, 151 Ga. App. 853,
261 S.E. 2d 764 (1979), aff'd. 245 Ga. 629, 266 S.E.2d 466 (1980),
and People v. Giles, 557 P.2d 408 (Colo. 1976).

All of these

cases dealt with statutory requirements not found in the corresponding Utah scheme.
The Bolton case held that a criminal acquitee must be
-11-
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given a hearing after his acquittal by reason of insanity.

The

standard for release at that hearing was held to be as provided
in the Washington, D.C. Code §24-301(3) 1967, to-wit: unconditional
release requires the superintendent of the mental hospital to
certify (1) that such person has recovered his sanity, and (2)
in the opinion of the superintendent such person will not in the
reasonable future be dangerous to himself or others (emphasis
added).
The Clark case dealt with a Georgia standard for release
of an insanity acquitee based on whether or not the person was
still mentally ill so as to authorize his involuntary commitment
under the Georgia Code Ann. §88-50l(a) and (v) (Ga. L.1978, pp 17891790). That code section provides that a mentally ill person
requires involuntary treatment if he "l . . . presents a substantial
risk of imminent harm to himself or others as manifested by recent
overt acts or recent expressed threats of violence which present
a probability of physical injury to himself or to other persons .

. ..

Although this case dealt with a schizophrenic, it is particularly
inapplicable because the person had refused to take his medication
two weeks before his hearing.

The Giles case, cited by Dr. Austin,

was decided under the Colorado statutory language of §16-8-120
C.R.S. (1973), which requires for release of an insanity acquitee
a finding that "the defendant has no abnormal mental condition
which would be likely to cause him to be dangerous either to
himself or to others or to the community in the reasonably foreseeable future."

While Giles held that it was permissable to have
-12-
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II

different standards for being found not guilty by reason of
insanity and being released following such a verdict, it certainly
did not mandate such a difference.
Even if the Utah c.ivil standard were applicable to this
case, it would require not just a "foreseeable danger" but "an
immediate danger" as required by the civil commitment standard
of §64-7-36(10)(a) and (b), Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended).

Dr.

LeBegue testified that after cessation of medication "it may take
months to a year for disorderly thinking, feeling, and behavior
to occur" in the appellant (7/18/80 T.23,37-39).

In fact, all

the expert witnesses testified that the appellant did not meet
the civil standard for commitment (Dr. LeBegue 7/18/80 T.18, Dr.
Mirow and Dr. Austin 7/22/81 T.25,31).
The various state statutory criteria for the release of
insanity acquitees fall into four groups of inquiry: 1) Is the
patient sane? 2) Is the patient not dangerous? 3) Is the patient
I

sane and not dangerouse? 4) Is the patient sane or not dangerous?
LeFave and Scott, Criminal Law 322 (1972), quoting Goldstein, A.,
The Insanity Defense (1967).

In his treatise Abraham Goldstein

points out that in state statutory schemes using the term "sanity"
alone, there is virtually nothing to explain it.

Id at 147.

A

great many states, however, he notes, make no reference to recovery
of sanity at all, but inquire only whether continued detention of
an insanity acquitee is necessary for the safety of the patient
or the public. Id at 148.
Because the Utah statutory scheme makes no mention of the
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issue of dangerousness or foreseeable harm, it was a violation of
the appellant's right to due process of law for the trial court to
consider these factors and arbitrarily determine that they apply.
It was also error for the court to consider in its decision of this
matter, the desire of the psychiatrists, prosecutor, and the court
to have this case litigated so that the Supreme Court and/or the
Utah Legislature might respond with a more definite standard for
review or with more "satisfactory" requirements

for review and

provisions for conditional release.l
1

Prosecutor discussing the possibility of conditional
release (7/18/80 T.11,14): "It will take a little bit of aborting
the law to a degree, because I don't think the law really covers
it. . . There is some basis for the statutory position that we
don't have a better alternative, then we better keep Mr. Jacob
there or adopt some type of a program, maybe change the law ourselves or force the legislature into some type of situaion where
they can change the law to coincide with the needs of Mr. Jacob.
Dr. LeBegue was asked, 'Ts it your desire to have this
matter litigated by the Supreme Court, that you might have a
middle ground that you have been asking for or wish to see enacted
somewhere?" He answered, "It is indicated that for treatment
reasons that middle ground should be available." (7/18/80 T.41)
Dr. Austin was asked, "What I am trying to get at, really,
doctor, is why have you indicated in the final sentence of the
letter, ·we cannot certify to the court that he's recovered from
his mental illness?
I am trying to find the underlying basis and
why you are saying that, why, when he is on medication, he's fine."
He answered, "The underlying reason is that there is absolutely
no standard at thi~ point for us to certify that he is recovered
from his mental illness. Therefore, we are quite willing to
present all the information to the court. We are saying the
psychological manifestations are in remission and therefore he is
recovered to that extent. However, we feel, based on our best
medical knowledge, that the biochemical disorder is still there,
therefore he isn't recovered from that part of the mental illness,
and we are willing to present that information and then let the
court decide whether that recovery from mental illness actually
means [sic] in this state." (7/22/81 T.14) (Footnote continued.)
-14-
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It may be quite proper for state mental health authorities
and the state's prosecuting authorities and trial judges to encourage
law reform and the enactment of statutes which recognize the problems
of the mentally ill and the

~dvances

phrenia and other mental illnesses.

in the treatment of schizoBut, depriving David Jacob

of

his liberty by refusing and neglecting to apply· the stautuory standard
in effect at the time the crime which gave rise to his incarceration
was connnitted, is not a proper means of such encouragement.

Any

future judicial or statutory changes would only apply to the
appellant if they operate in favor of his substantial right to his
liberty.
III
THE STANDARD FOR DETERMINING WHETHER THE
APPELLANT HAS BEEN "RESTORED TO SANITY"
MUST BE BASED ON THE STANDARD DEFINED BY
§76-2-305(1).
Section 76-2-305(1) provides:
Mental disease or defect.--(1) In any
prosecution for an offense, it shall be a
defense that the defendant, at the time of
the prescribed conduct, as a result of mental
disease or defect, lacked substantial capacity
either to appreciate the wrongfulness of his
conduct or to conform his conduct to the re uirements of law. (Emphasis added.

1 continued
The court's order of August 7, 1981: Since there is no
likelihood that a cure for defendant's illness will be discovered
soon, the above ruling may well result in the lifetime institut~on
alization of an individual who could function adequately, and without danger, in. the community, if his medication were carefully and
closely supervised. However, no means of lawful supervision appears
to exist· at this time, and some revision of existing law would seem
to be required before the defendant in his present condition could
be released.
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The verdict against the appellant was entered pursuant
to former §77-33-4 (replaced July 1, 1980 with §77-35-2(a)
for a not guilty by reason of mental illness verdict).

providing

§77-33-4

provided:
When the defendant is acquitted on the ground
that he was insane at the time of the commission
of the act charged, the verdict must be "not
guilty by reason of insanity."
The procedure to follow such a verdict was set out in
§ 76-24-15 and § 76-24-16, supra.

Thus the context in which "recovered

his- sanity" was used, directly related to insanity as a criminal
defense and is the only standard available to the court under the
applicable criminal law and procedure.
If this court finds that there is no standard or that
what standard there is, is too vague for the court to be able to
ascertain it's meaning, then §76-24-15 and 16 must be deemed
unconstitutional and the appellant must be released.
A statute violates the first essential of due process
if it is so vague that persons of common intelligence must necessarily
guess at its meaning.

State v. Packard, 122 Utah 369, 340 P.2d

561 (1952), State v. Andazola, 95 N.M. 430, 622 P.2d 1050 (1981).
A statute meets due process requirements if it provides explicit
standards to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.
A statute which fails to provide such standards is unconstitutionally
vag.U;e.

State v. Rhodes, 92 Wash. 2d 755, 600 P.2d 1264 (1979).

See Connally, supra.
In Walonsky v. Balson, 58 Ohio App. 2d 25, 387 N.E.2d
625 (1976) the Ohio Court of Appeals dealt with an Ohio statutory
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scheme similar to Utah's.

In that case, an insanity acquitee was

seeking release from commitment to the state hospital.

The Ohio

Code Section 2945.39 provided for release "when a patient's sanity
has been restored."

Under this language the court held that the

issue was "not whether the petitioner may still be dangerous to
himself or society or whether he still is mentally deficient or
mentally ill, but whether he is legally sane."

The Ohio definition

of legal sanity was established in State v. Staten, 25 Ohio St.2d
107, 267 N.E. 2d 122 (1971).

The Wolonsky court applied that

definition and held that the question was 'whether he now

has the

capacity either to know the wrongfulness of his conduct or to
conform his conduct to the requirements of law."

387 N.E.2d at

625,626.
Ohio , at the time of this decision, had no provision for
conditional release.

The court held without discussing any of the

particular facts of diagnosis, medication, or the previous
criminal history of the patient, that a person restored to sanity
[in fact admitting that he had been restored to sanity] though
the use of drugs which he must continue to take to remain sane,
was not sane within the meaning of the statute."

Id at 627.

In 1978, the Ohio Code was changed to provide for a
hearing to determine whether a person is mentally ill and the
least restrictive commitment alternative consistent with the
public safely and the welfare of the person.

Ohio R.C. 2945.39

and 2945.40.
Approximately two-thirds of the states have provisions
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for conditional release of an insanity acquitee.
have systems of indefinite detention.

All the states

Goldstein, supra at 150.

It is very difficult to ignore the issue of whether a person will
continue to be nondangerous when a state has no provision for
conditional release.

An insanity acquitee is found innocent for

lack of capacity to formulate mens rea, yet the presence of an
actus rea and the possibility of a potential future actus rea
means that though innocent, he continues to be controlled by the
processes of

~he

criminal law.

This can make him subject to

deprivation of his liberty not because of his current mental
condition as it relates to sanity but because of the possfubility
of future misbehavior.

Comment, 27 Rutgers L.Rev.160 (1973).

While it is difficult to ignore this potential for harm,
the appellant contends it must be done in his case because as the
law stands in Utah it is not a valid basis of consideration.

To

take it into account and at the same time maintain it shouldn't
be taken into account as the Wolonsky court did amounts to a legal
absurdity and ignores common logic and the ordinary meaning of
language.

A person is -either restored to sanity or not restored

to sanity.

A person is either able to appreciate the wrongfulness

of his conduct and conform his conduct to the requirements of the
law or he is not.

IV

THE COURT SHOULD HAVE FOUND THAT THE FACTS
IN THIS CASE SATISFY THE REQUIREMENT THAT
THE APPELLANT'S SANITY HAS BEEN RESTORED.
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TO HOLD OTHERWISE AMOUNTS TO AN UNCONSTUTIONAL
INCARCERATION BASED ON STATUS.
All the testimony by the expert witnesses was that the
appellant presently met the standard of being able to appreciate
the wrongfulness of his conduct and being able to conform his
conduct to the requirements of law.

(Dr. Mirow and Dr. Austin,

7/22/81 T.26,31,32, Dr. LeBegue 7/18/80 T.29).

In addition,

the testimony was that the appellant had been, for more than a
year, free from any manifestations of his illness (7/22/81 T.3,
8,12-14,21,31).

To find, in view of that testimony, that the

appellant has not been restored to his sanity amounts to subjecting
him to a criminal commitment based on status.

To hold that any

insanity acquitee must be restored to his sanity so as to be
unquestionably permanently sane amounts to an impossibility.
Lex

~

intendit aliguid impossibile.

(The law does not intend

anything impossible.)
The appellant would argue that the trial court was

co~rect

in its assessment that the definition of sanity must be a functional
definition.

Otherwise, the court stated, "we really would be

dealing with an incarceration based on one's status as a chronic
schizophrenic."

(7/18/80 T.60).

In Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 82 S.Ct.1417, 8 L.Ed.
758 (1962), the United States Supreme Court examined a California

statute which made it a crime to be a drug addict.

The

c~urt

that a state law which imprisons a person thus afflicted as a
-19-
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held

criminal even though he has never touched any narcotic drug within
the state, or been guilty of any irregular behavior there, inflicts
a cru.e1

and unusual punishment in violation of the Fourteenth

Amendment.

370 U.S. at 667, SL.Ed at 763.

The Court based it's decision in part on the fact that
narcotics addiction is an illness which can be contracted innocently
or involuntarily.

Id.

The same is true of the illness with which the appellant
is afficted.

The recovery of sanity by a person previously insane

can be effected by a variety of means.

It can occur as a result

of psychotherapy, administration of electric shock therapy or
antipsychotic drugs, cessation of the use of mind altering chemicals
or simply by an Act of God.
The appellant contends that he has no more potential for
a return to insanity than persons restored to their sanity in
other ways.

In fact, it can be argued he has less potential

because he is fortunate enough to have a mental illness which can
be and has been diagnosed and completely controlled by a readily
available medication.2
In the past, the appellant had had some difficulty finding
the right medication to control his illness.

At the July 18, 1980

hearing, Dr. LeBegue testified that the appellant had not responded

Schizophrenia is not a uncommon illness. It is estimated
that 25% of all hospitable admissions for mental illnesses are
diagno~ed as schiozophrenia.
Approximately 1% of the people of
t~e U~ited States will be diagnosed as schizophrenic during their
lifetimes. Abnormal Psychology, Current Perspectives 271 (1972).
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well to the long acting form of antipsycotics and would require
lifetime daily treatment (7/18/80 T.19-22).

But at the July 22,

1981 hearing, Dr. Austin testified that the appellant was functioning
extremely well on an injection of .5 cc's of prolixin every two

'

weeks with an elimination of the psychological manifestations of
his illness even though the biochemical disorder remained (7/22/81
T.3,4,13,14).
David Jacobs testified at the July 22, 1981 hearing that
while in the past he was taking as much as 2.5 cc's of prolixin
every two weeks and having substantial side effects of severe
muscle contortions and an inability to control his tongue, that
presently he was having no side effects, that the trouble had been
getting the right amount of the right medication, and that on his
present: dose he did not feel medicated (July 22, 1981 T.27-29,30).
See AMA Drug Evaluations, Third Edition (1977)

for overview of

various antipsycotic agents.
The New Jersey Supreme Court in State v. Maik, 60 N.J.203,287
A.2d 715 (1973), dealt with the New Jersey statute which required
the court fo find that a person had been "restored to reason".
N.J. Stat. Ann. §2A-163-3, 163-2 (1971).

The case concerned a

person who had suffered a psychotic, schizophrenic break as a
result of using hallicinogenic drugs.

The court held that restora-

tion to reason occurs when the underlying latent condition or
illness precipitating the defendant's psycotic episode is removed
or effectively neutralized.

287 A.2d at 723.

The court rejected

a standard of mere remission, because the cause and duration of __ a
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spontaneous remission is unknown.

Id at 722-23.

The appellant contends that he has experienced since the
time of his offense, not only a remission but also an effective
neutralization of the chemical disorder with which he is afflicted.
This has come about because the doctors have finally found the
best medication for the appellant which he has now been on for
more than a year.

There is absolutely nothing more the appellant

can do to show or prove himself more sane that he has done already.
To continue to punish him for being unable to do this and for being
afflicted with a disease which he has through no fault of his own
is the essence of cruel and unusual punishment.

Under absolutely

no other standard of sanity in the law would there be any question
as to David Jacob's sanity in his present condition.

He would

undoubtedly be found sane enough to write a will, make a contract,
be a witness, get married, commit a crime, and stand trial for
that crime.

Would a jury find him not guilty of that crime on

the basis that the court has found that he is not sane?
not.

Certainly

All the experts have testified that he is sane for that

purpose.
The appellant recognizes that if he is given his liberty
there will be a possibility that he will not continue to receive
the medication which neutralizes his disease.

The law would not

be powerless in the face of such an eventuality .

The civil and

criminal laws would still apply to the appellant as they do to
every other citizen.
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Risk cannot be eliminated from the processes of law, but
laws are in effect to cover such risk.
If the appellant is to be sentenced to an incarceration
based on pa.st misdeeds it must be after a criminal conviction.
The trial court found that the appellant is sane in his present
condition.

The trial court's ruling, in effect, sentences the

appellant to a possible life long commitment based on the possibility
of future misdeeds because of the specific way by which he has been
restored to his sanity.
to his sanity.

But it is the only way he can be restored

Thus it is an incarceration based on his statute

as a sane person with schizophrenia, a mental illness for which
he bears no responsibility.

This is precisely the kind of incarer-

ation for status which was condemned by the United States Supreme
Court in Robinson v. California, supra.
CONCLUSION
The trial court erred in it's application of §77-14-5 to
this case by basing its order on whether the appellant has recovered
from his mental illness.

The court should have applied former

§77-24-15 and §77-24-16 and inquired whether the appellant's sanity
has been restored.

The court erred in using the standard of

sanity "of being reasonably expected to not be a threat or a danger
of harm to himself or others in the foreseeable future."

The court

should have used a definition of sanity as it is defined in §76-2-305
(1) as "being able to appreciate the wrongfulness of one's conduct
and conform one's conduct to the requirements of law."
-23-
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If the proper standards had been used the court should
have found, based on all the evidence, that the appellant has
been restored to his sanity and ordered him released from the
custody of Utah State Hosptial.
The appellant requests relief from these errors of the
'trial court in the form of an order releasing him from the Utah
State

~ospital

since, according to all the evidence, his sanity

has been restored.

In the alternative, the appellant requests an

order remanding this matter to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with the proper standards of law.
Respectfully submitted this

I~ ~

day of

D£,~rn-kv

,

1982,

DELIVERED a. copy of the foregoing to the Attorney General's
Office, 236 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114,
this

---

day of

-24-
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